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WORK, STUDY, ORGANIZE!: WHY THE
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY FOOTBALL
PLAYERS ARE EMPLOYEES UNDER THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
CesarF. Rosado Marzain & Alex Tillett-Saks*
INTRODUCTION

As we come marching, marching, unnumbered women dead
Go crying through our singing their ancient cry for bread.
Small art and love and beauty their drudgingspirits knew.
Yes, it is breadwe fightfor-but we fightfor roses, too!
James Oppenheim, "Bread and Roses."'
Workers toil in more precarious conditions each day in the United
States and abroad.2 Such precarious conditions are in important respects
created by increased nonstandard relations of employment where
employers release themselves from their employer obligations while
getting most of the benefits of workers' work. Some of these strategies
include subcontracting and hiring part-time workers and temporary

. C6sar F. Rosado Marzin, PhD, J.D., is an Associate Professor of Law at IT ChicagoKent College of Law. He is also a member of the Regulating Markets and Labour Programme at
Stockholm University. Alex Tillett-Saks is a law graduate of 1IT Chicago-Kent College of Law,
Class of 2015. Parts of this article were published previously as an amicus brief authored by Cdsar
F. Rosado Marzdn with substantial assistance by Alex Tillett-Saks. The authors thank Catherine
Fisk, Julia Tomassetti, Melissa Weiner, and Noah Zatz for comments made to prior versions of this
article. The authors also thank Laura Caringella for editorial assistance. All mistakes and omissions
remain the sole responsibility of the authors. Direct all inquiries to crosado@kentlaw.iit.edu.
1. James Oppenheim, Bread and Roses (1911), in Bread and Roses (1910s), FOLKARCHIVE,
http://www.folkarchive.de/breadrose.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
2. See Arne Kalleberg, Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: Employment Relations in
Transition, 74 AM. Soc. REv. 1, 2, 6-8 (2009); GUY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW
DANGEROUS CLASS 47-49, 52-58 (2011).
3. See STANDING, supra note 2, at 52-76 (describing tactics employers use to exploit the
needs of certain vulnerable employees, ultimately paying them less than their true value).
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workers.4 Others may include disguising employment relationships,
consciously or not, as something else-as pedagogic, rehabilitative,
familial, as independent contractors, or otherwise "non-employee"
relationships.' As such, many workers today work intermittently and
without the basic rights of employment.6 Pension and health benefits,
rights to sick days and holidays, vacation time, expectations of
promotion and career-building ladders, and other job characteristics
associated with a middle class standard of living and the so-called
"American dream" are dissipating.7
Against this background, we have the recent plight of college
athletes in revenue-generating sports who are attempting to secure better
compensation, health care, protections against catastrophic injury and
death, rights to profit from their names, images, and likenesses, among
other rights that they currently do not have because the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 8 rules forbid them.9 While
college athletes likely live under better conditions than most nonstandard

4. Katherine V.W. Stone & Harry Arthurs, The Transformation of Employment Regimes: A
Worldwide Challenge, in RETINKING WORKPLACE REGULATION: BEYOND THE STANDARD
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 1, 4, 7 (Katherine V.W. Stone & Harry Arthurs, eds., 2013).
5. See Julia Tomassetti, Who Is a Worker? Partisanship, the National Labor Relations

Board, and the Social Content of Employment, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 815, 817-18 (2013)
(discussing how Republican-majority National Labor Relations Board decisions have denied labor
rights to graduate students, disabled janitors and many other nonstandard employees, or about
twenty-five percent of the U.S. workforce under the guise that they are not employees but
something else); see also AM. RIGHTS AT WORK, THE HAVES AND THE HAVE-NOTS: How
AMERICAN LABOR LAW DENIES A QUARTER OF THE WORKFORCE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
RIGHTS 3 (2008); JENNIFER JIHYE CHUN, ORGANIZING AT THE MARGINS: THE SYMBOLIC POLITICS
OF LABOR IN SOUTH KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES, at xi-xiv (2011) (discussing how employee

classification serves to marginalize groups of workers).
6. AM. RIGHTS AT WORK, supranote 5, at 2.
7. Stone & Arthurs, supra note 4, at 1-2; see also Marianne Page, Are Jobs the Solution to
available
at
9,
12,
2014,
at
Summer
Poverty?,
PATHWAYS,

http://web.stanford.edulgroup/scspi/_medialpdf/pathways/summer2014/PathwaysSummer 2014
Page.pdf (arguing that the social science research shows that in today's economy where most job
growth is in low skill, low paying jobs, job growth is no longer sufficient to eliminate poverty in the
U.S.).
8. The NCAA self-defines itself as "a membership-driven organization dedicated to
safeguarding the well-being of student-athletes and equipping them with the skills to succeed on the
playing field, in the classroom and throughout life." About the NCAA, NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/about (last visited Aug. 21, 2014). Its members are mostly colleges and
universities. Id.

9. See Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the StudentAthlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 84 (2006) [hereinafter The Myth of
the Student-Athlete] (arguing that the NCAA coined the term "student-athlete" to mask the fact that
athletes are employees, in an attempt to deny the employee rights); O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp.
3d 955, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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employees, such as maintenance employees hired through temp
agencies10 or low-skilled immigrants, college athletes face similar legal
and social challenges. The NCAA, its member universities, and its
conferences deny college athletes labor and other rights under the veil of
amateurism, essentially arguing that college athletes play for "the love of
the game" and to pursue academic fields of study at their university. 12 In
this regard, these putative employers, the universities, use the same
argument that, for example, a health institution made to a Bush II-era
National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter referred to as "NLRB" or
"Board") when its janitors, who were also its disabled "clients," tried to
unionize: that the janitors were not employees because they were in a
"primarily rehabilitative" relationship with the employer, not in an
employment one. 13 The employer prevailed and the disabled janitors
were left bereft of labor rights. 14
But perhaps things are changing. The amateur condition of
"student-athletes"-a term that we eschew in this article and substitute
with the more accurate "college athlete"-in revenue-generating sports is
facing serious scrutiny by Congress, the courts, and government
agencies and the popular media.15 After decades of public discomfort
over the commercialization of these sports, the exploitation of the
players, and the marginalization of the educational goals of colleges and

10. See H.S. Care L.L.C., v. N.Y. Health & Hum. Serv. Union, 343 N.L.R.B. 659, 663 (2004)
(Liebman'and Walsh, dissenting) ("The Board... effectively bars... another group of
employees-the sizeable number of workers in alternative work arrangements-from organizing

labor unions, by making them get their employers' permission first.").
11.

See JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS

10-19 (2005) (describing how immigrant workers live in far poorer conditions than most, due to the
current employment law system).
12. See discussion infra Part III.

13. Brevard Achievement Ctr. Inc., v. Transp. Workers Union Am., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 986
(2004).
14. See id.; see also Tomassetti, supra note 5, at 818 ("[The Brevard majority] equated
'primarily economic' with contractual relations consummated in a self-regulating market .... [It]
reconstructed and located the relationships at issue in a nonmarket sphere where the Act was

inapplicable.

By discursively exploiting the assimilation of status to contract in common law

employment, [the Brevard majority] interpreted indicia in these cases consistent with employer
property rights as incidents of status authority and the parties' mutual interests. By denying [an
employment relationship] they suppressed employment's class dimension and negated the Act as an
instrument to curb employer property rights . . . .").
15. See, e.g., Taylor Branch, NCAA to Congress: Change is Coming, THE ATLANTIC (July 24,
2014),
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2014/07/the-ncaa-tells-

congress-its-going-to-reform-itself/374948/; O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 989 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (noting that revenue-generating sports of the NCAA are subject to anti-trust laws because,
inter alia, they are no longer merely amateur in nature, but are commercial).
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universities, the veil may be dropping.16 Among the agencies that seem
to have finally looked under the veil of amateurism is the NLRB." In
May, 2014, Region 13 of the NLRB issued a decision stating that
Northwestern University's grant-in-aid football players are employees
under the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter referred to as
"NLRA" or "Act").' 8 If Region 13's decision stands, these college
athletes can vote for union representation.' 9 As of this writing, the case
was granted review before the NLRB.20
The response from the NCAA, Northwestern University, and the
management bar has been typical. They have argued that the football
players are primarily students, not employees. 2 1 As such, the college
athletes have no rights to bargain collectively with Northwestern
University despite the obvious commercialization of college football.22
Some commentators, including Professor Zev Eigen of Northwestern
University Law School, rejected that college athletes are employees
16. Branch, supra note 15; see MARK YOST, VARSITY GREEN: A BEHIND THE SCENES LOOK
AT CULTURE AND CORRUPTION IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS 5, 9-10 (2010) (arguing that the high
monetary stakes in college sports, including those created by television rights and sneaker contracts,
have usurped the goals of higher education); MURRAY SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS: How BIG-TIME
COLLEGE SPORTS IS CRIPPLING EDUCATION 216, 221 (2000) (arguing that colleges and universities
should focus on undergraduate education and set aside large athletic programs, which have
commercialized and usurped the pedagogical goals of higher education); ANDREW ZIMBALIST,
UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 199-204

(1999) (arguing that college football and basketball are all but amateur due to their intense
commercialization, and that there needs to be a revamping of college sports, including banning
freshmen from participation, banning coaches from making "sneaker money," and permitting nonstudents to play in college leagues); ALLEN J. SACK AND ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, COLLEGE
ATHLETES FOR HIRE: THE EVOLUTION AND LEGACY OF THE NCAA's AMATEUR MYTH 6 (1998)

(claiming that the NCAA has instilled since its beginning a myth that it serves to promote
amateurism while practically professionalizing college sports and commercializing it, along the way
transforming

"some of America's

most prestigious universities

into centers of fraud and

hypocrisy"); on the conflicts between college athletes, their universities and colleges, and the
NCAA; see generally RONALD A. SMITH, PAY FOR PLAY: THE HISTORY OF BIG-TIME COLLEGE
ATHLETIC REFORM 186 (Benjamin G. Rader & Randy Roberts eds., 2011) (asserting that college
sports have crowded out the educational mission of colleges despite failed attempts to reform

college sports).
17. See, e.g., Nw. Univ. v. Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n (CAPA), Case No. 13-RC-121359
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014), petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.
18. Id. at 2, 17.
19. Id. at 2.
20. Nw. Univ. v. Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n (CAPA), Case No. 13-RC-121359 (N.L.R.B.
Apr. 24, 2014).
21. Brian
Bennett,
Northwestern
Players
Get
Union
Vote,
ESPN.coM
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/10677763/northwestem-wildcats-football-players-

win-bid-unionize (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
22. Id.
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under the terms that they have with universities and colleges today.23
Others, including a former college football coach, supported the
athletes.

24

This article argues that Region 13 of the NLRB was correct to hold
that Northwestern University's college athletes are employees under the
Act. The NLRB and the Courts should sustain Region 13's decision
because the grant-in-aid college athletes of Northwestern University
meet the three rules normally used to determine employee status under
the NLRA: the "right of control test," the "economic realities test," and
the "primary purpose test." 2 5 In essence, Northwestern University very
clearly retains a right to control the college athletes in activities that lie
outside of academics.26 We argue below that the college athletes
provide a valuable service, athletics, which has nothing to do with their
academic degrees and is subject to the supervision and control of
Northwestern University while being performed.2 7 Moreover, the
college athletes are dependent on Northwestern University to cover their
basic living expenses and degree costs at the University because they
receive scholarships, 28 perhaps also stipends, 29 and Northwestern
University severely limits their capacity to make any money from other
sources. 30 Finally, the college athletes' relationship with Northwestern

23.

POST

Zev Eigen, Why College Athletes Aren't Really Employees - But Should Be, HUFFINGTON

(March

31,

2014),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/zev-j-eigen/why-college-athletes-

&

aren_b_5063073.html. Professor Eigen argues that college athletes are not employees under the Act
because they are primarily students. The fact that a university profits from the college athletes'
feats is irrelevant. Otherwise, not-for-profits could easily escape NLRA coverage by arguing that
they make no profits. However, he argues that universities should create two tracks for college
athletes- a student and an athlete track-which would provide labor rights to college athletes. Id.
However, the issue of not-for-profits has been decided by the Board. It presently excludes, under its
discretion, not-for-profit employers from NLRA coverage if they generate revenue under certain
limits and are thus not significantly involved in interstate commerce; see MATTHEW FINKIN
ROBERT GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 30

(2d. ed. 2008) (citing YMCA Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1448-49 (10th Cir.
1990)). Moreover, the university may not create or destroy labor rights through contract, which lies
at the essence of Professor Eigen's "two-track" suggestion. The "two tracks" must be, in real terms,
different tracks, and it is uncertain whether any of "employee" track players will have any terms that
differ from those that they have today. Eigen, supra.
24. See Brad Wolverton, Amateurism May be Dead, but a New Educational Model is Born,
THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Aug. 10, 2014), http://chronicle.com/article/Amateurism-

May-Be-Dead-but-a/148345/.
25. Nw. Univ., at 13-14, petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167.
26. Id. at 10-13.
27. See discussion infra Part II.
28. Nw. Univ., at 3, 14, petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 16.
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University is not primarily one of "student" because their athletic duties
are completely unrelated to their academic duties. 3 1 They are both
students and athletes-subordinated and exploited, that is. In fact, the
college athletes' capacity to curb further commercialization of their sport
and protect their status as bona fide students may well hinge on their
capacity to organize and bargain collectively against the much better
organized university. Other scholars have argued that college athletes in
revenue-generating sports, generally speaking, meet these three tests.32
However, this article analyzes the first real case of college athlete
unionization that reaches the shores of the NLRB. We show that, based
on the specific facts of the case, these college athletes are employees
under the Act. Therefore, the NLRB and the courts should sustain the
decision of Region 13.
Moreover, in case there were lingering doubts as to the employee
status of these college athletes, the purposes of the NLRA compel us to
answer the question of employee status in no other way but in the
affirmative. The NLRA aims to provide employees, weaker parties in
employment relationships, with bargaining rights in order to preserve
industrial peace.3 3 Here, we have a case of a weaker party, the college
athletes, who have been attempting to secure better terms and conditions
with Northwestern University, including protections from catastrophic
injuries and adequacy of compensation, among others, leading to
31. Id. at 11, 18-19.
32. Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, A Trail of Tears: The Exploitation
of the College Athlete, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 639, 646-55 (2010); see also The Myth of the
Student-Athlete, supra note 9, at 71, 79 (arguing that NCAA Division I, grant-in-aid college athletes
playing in revenue sports are employees); Nicholas Fram & T. Ward Frampton, A Union of
Amateurs: A Legal Blueprint to Reshape Big-Time College Athletics, 60 BuFF. L. REV. 1003, 103236 (2012) (asserting that NCAA Division 1, grant-in-aid college athletes playing in revenue sports
are employees under the NLRA pursuant to both the right of control and primary purpose tests).

Many other legal articles and notes that have supported the unionization of college athletes, as well;
see, e.g., Leroy D. Clark, New Directionsfor the Civil Rights Movement: College Athletics as a

Civil Rights Issue, 36 How. L.J. 259, 278 (1993); Stephen L. Ukeiley, No Salary, No Union, No
Collective Bargaining:ScholarshipAthletes Are An Employer's Dream Come True, 6 SETON HALL

J. SPORT L. 167, 193 (1996); Nathan McCoy & Kerry Knox, Comment, Flexing Union Muscle-Is
it the Right Game Plan For Revenue Generating Student-Athletes in Their Contest for Benefits

Reform with the NCAA?, 69 TENN. L. REV. 1051, 1063 (2002); J. Trevor Johnston, Show Them The
Money: The Threat ofNCAA Athlete Unionizationin Response to the CommercializationofCollege

Sports, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 203, 231 (2003); Jonathan L.H. Nygren, Forcingthe NCAA to
Listen: Using Labor Law to Force the NCAA to Bargain Collectively with Student-Athletes, 2 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 359, 362 (2003); Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The
Emperor's New Clothes: Lifting the NCAA's Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 497
(2008).
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (discussing findings and policy under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)).
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significant strife with Northwestern University in the way of lawsuits
and an organizing campaign. 34 The NLRA attempts to ameliorate
precisely these sorts of disputes through collective bargaining.
Therefore federal labor policy, in addition to the black letter rules,
compels us to find the college athletes in this case to be employees under
the NLRA.
However, this article is novel in that it goes further than Region 13
and scholars who have argued for the employee status of college
athletes. We argue that walk-on college athletes, or those in revenuegenerating sports who do not receive scholarships, can potentially also
be employees under the NLRA. Region 13 argued that these players
were not employees because they did not receive compensation from
However, walk-ons likely have a
Northwestern University. 36
"fundamentally economic relationship" with Northwestern Universitythe key principle undergirding the NLRB's compensation requirement
for employee status3 7-and, as such, may also be subject to the NLRB's
jurisdiction.
We also take note that the case of Northwestern University's
football players is significant beyond college sports. If college athletes
in revenue-generating sports are seen for what they are, employees that
are also students, other groups of workers in more precarious conditions,
but in similar nonstandard contracts of employment, may fare better
when they seek the aid of the law. Disabled janitor "clients" working for
their rehabilitation institutions, graduate students working as teaching
assistants and research assistants,39 franchise employees seeking to
bargain with the franchisors, and not just their direct employers, the
franchisees, 4 0 and a slew of other nonstandard employees, may have a

34.

See, e.g., Tom Farrey, Kain Colter Starts Union Movement, ESPN OUTSIDE THE LINES,

http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/ /id/10363430/outside-lines-northwestem-wildcats-footballplayers-trying-join-labor-union (last updated Jan. 28, 2014).
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 151.
36. Nw. Univ., at 1, 22, petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167.
37. Id. at 22.
38. Brevard Achievement Ctr. Inc., v. Transp. Workers Union Am., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 986
(2004).
39. See Brown Univ. v. Int'l Union, 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
40. Dozens of unfair labor practice claims [hereinafter ULPs] by McDonald's employees
against the parent corporations are pending before the NLRB. See NLRB Office of the General
Counsel Authorizes Complaints Against McDonald's Franchisees and Determines McDonald's,

USA, LLC is a Joint Employer, NLRB (July 29, 2014), http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach-newsIn
a
recent
story/nlrb-office-general-counsel-authorizes-complaints-against-mcdonalds.
determination by NLRB's General Counsel, the ULPs may proceed against the franchisor, the
parent corporation McDonald's, as a joint employer. See id. Whether or not the joint employer
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better chance to meet justice in the future.
This article proceeds in the following way: Part I argues that
Northwestern University's college athletes are employees under existing
NLRB rules. Part II argues that a finding that college athletes are
employees under the Act is squarely backed by the general purposes of
the NLRA to protect weaker parties and foment collective bargaining to
reduce industrial strife. The commercialization of college football is
intense. 4 1 The vast amounts of revenue that the NCAA, the universities,
the Conferences, the television networks, and many other parties make is
also substantial and contrasts with the feeble revenue that the main stars
in this industry, the college athletes, make.42 Some college athletes
make no money at all.43 Many get temporarily or permanently injured
and disabled.4 Naturally, these inequities have led to industrial strife.45
The NLRA was designed to deal precisely with such disputes through
collective bargaining.4 6
Finally, Part III argues that walk-on college athletes could also
potentially be employees under the Act because they may be in a
"fundamentally economic relationship" with Northwestern University
despite not receiving a scholarship. While they do not receive a
scholarship initially, ten percent of them eventually get a scholarship.47
Therefore, playing for Northwestern University may be a way to secure
a scholarship in the future. 4 8 Moreover, walk-ons are compensated,
broadly defined, by being permitted to play college football and
therefore may get a chance to play professionally in the National

determination will stand remains to be seen.

41.

See O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 988-89 (N.D. Cal. 2014).

42.

See id.; see, e.g., Chris Smith, College Football's Most Valuable Teams, FORBES (Dec.

22, 2011, 11:43 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2011/12/22/college-footballs-mostvaluable-teams/ (demonstrating how universities and their affiliates profit from college football
teams).

43. See Nw. Univ. v. Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n (CAPA), Case No. 13-RC-121359, at 3
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014), petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359 (explaining that the only form of compensation that
college athletes can make is in the form of a scholarship and not all students receive scholarship

funding); Ukeiley, supranote 32, at 168-69.
44.

Jeffrey Eisenband, Who is Kain Colter? Former Northwestern QB Takes Spotlight On

Larger Stage, THE POST GAME (Jan. 29, 2014, 1:01 AM), http://www.thepostgame.com/blog/menaction/201401/kain-colter-northwestem-football-college-sports-union.

45. See Brief for Labor Law Professors et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner
[hereinafter Labor Law Professors' Brief| at 3, Nw. Univ. Case No. 13-RC-121359 (N.L.R.B. Mar.
26, 2014) (No. 13-RC-121359).
46. See id. at 3, 18.
47. See discussion infra pp. 334-35.
48. See discussion infra pp. 334-35.
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Football League (NFL). 49 In return for the chance, even if slight, of
compensation through a scholarship, and the future chance to play for
the NFL, the walk-ons subject themselves to the almost identical
limitations of the grant-in-aid college athletes, including those regarding
the number of hours they must dedicate to football and serious limits on
their capacity to obtain gainful employment or to profit from their image
while playing for the team.50 The article then concludes by arguing not
only in favor of the employee status of college athletes in order to meet
the strictures of the NLRA, the NLRB's rules, and federal labor policy,
but also to refract back some hope to other groups hired through
nonstandard employment contracts, who likely live much more
precarious lives and, therefore, need the aid of the law.
I. THE COLLEGE ATHLETES ARE EMPLOYEES UNDER THE NLRB'S
EXISTING RULES

There is no bright line rule that can be used to answer whether or
not college football players are employees under the NLRA; the Act
says nothing explicit about the employee or non-employee status of
college football players.5 1 Rather, the NLRA's Section 2(3), very
broadly but circularly defines "employee" as "any employee, and shall
not be limited to the employees of a particular employer. . . ."S2 The
statute provides a number of exceptions, such as agricultural and
domestic employees, but college football players, or "student-athletes,"
as the employer claims the college football players are, are not in those
stated exceptions. 5 3
Lacking further statutory guidance, the NLRB and the courts have
primarily used the common law "right of control test" to determine
employee status.54 Two other tests complement the "right of control
test": the "economic realities test" and the "primary purpose test."5 5
Professors Robert McCormick and Amy Christian McCormick have
argued that college athletes in revenue-generating sports meet all three

49. See Labor Law Professors' Brief, supra note 45, at 24.
50. See Nw. Univ. v. Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n (CAPA), Case No. 13-RC-121359, at 4-9
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014), petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.
51. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
52. Id.; see also Nw. Univ., at 13,petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167.
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (3).
54. See The Myth of the Student-Athlete, supra note 9, at 91-92.
55. See id. at 92; Fram & Frampton supranote 32, at 1033.
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tests and therefore, should be considered employees under the NLRA.
Here we find that the Northwestern University grant-in-aid college
football players clearly and unmistakably meet all three criteria. Region
13 was correct to find the college athletes to be employees under the
Act. The NLRB and the Courts should sustain that conclusion.
A. Northwestern University Has a Right to Control the College Athletes
in Tasks Unrelatedto the College Athletes' Education
Because the Act is silent on who is a statutory employee, other than
its circular definition of "employee of any employer," the Board and the
courts have referred to the "right of control" test of the common law.5

The NLRB has stated that, "an employee is a person who performs
services for another under a contract of hire, subject to the other's
control or right of control, and in return for payment." 58 Northwestern
University clearly exerts considerable control over the college athletes
on the field, as the grant-in-aid scholarships that the college athletes
receive only remain in effect if the college athletes satisfy the demands
of Northwestern University on the field, outside the purview of
academic life.59
First, the college athletes sign a contract, which Northwestern
University calls a "tender," that explicitly sets out the terms and
conditions that the college athletes must abide by.60 As part of this
tender, the college athletes agree to work only for Northwestern
However, no
University unless otherwise granted permission.i6
permission for other work shall ever be granted by Northwestern
University if the other work is related to the college athlete's athletic
ability and/or reputation as a football player.6 2 Northwestern University,

56.

The Myth of the Student-Athlete, supra note 9, at 92.

&

57. The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2 (1958) defines a servant, e.g., employee, as "an
agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the
performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master."; see also
NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256-59 (1968); Roadway Package Sys. Inc., 326
N.L.R.B. 842, 849-50 (1998).
58. Brown Univ. v. Int'l Union 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490 at n.27 (quoting NLRB v. Town
Country Elec., 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995)).
59. Nw. Univ. v. Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n (CAPA), Case No. 13-RC-121359, at 13-16
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014), petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015), availableat
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.
60. Id. at 14-15.
61. Id. at 16.
62. Id. at 4, 14.
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third parties such as the NCAA, the Conferences,63 and the coaches,
have rights to profit off of the college athlete's athletic feats, but the
athlete himself does not retain such rights.64 Northwestern University's
coach, Pat Fitzgerald, for example, has an annual salary worth about
$1.8 million.65
The coaches, who serve as supervisors over the college athletes,
mandate what positions the college athletes will play, how they will play
the game, how they will train for the game, and how they will stay in
shape during the off-season.66 The control is even more apparent in how
the college athletes must live their lives off the field.67 Northwestern
University controls the college athletes' use of alcohol and drugs,
gambling, and what they may say to the media or post on the Internet. 6 8
Even more controlling is how Northwestern University supervises the
college athletes' living arrangements, and suppresses their ability to
apply for outside employment, to drive personal vehicles, and even to
travel off campus. 69 Northwestern University strictly sets the college
athletes' itinerary during both the season and the off-season, at times
controlling their schedule from the time they wake up to the time they go
to bed.70 This itinerary consists of forty to fifty hours of training and
other demands-i.e., valuable services-during the season, and fifty to
sixty hours during training camp, well over the traditional forty-hour
work week.n Professors McCormick and McCormick reported that this
same type of control existed in at least four teams, suggesting that it is
typical of college football and men's basketball.72
There is no question whatsoever that Northwestern University
controls college athletes' activities on the field, as well as in activities

63.

The NCAA is comprised of different conferences, and teams compete more frequently

with teams in their conference. See generally, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org (last visited Mar. 2,

2015).
64. See Nw. Univ., at 4-5, petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167; see also The Myth of the
Student-Athlete, supranote 9, at 156.

65.

Teddy Greenstein, FitzgeraldDeal Worth $1.8 Million a Year Coach Says He Hopes to be

a Northwestern Lifer, CHITRIB. (May 10, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-05-

10/sports/ct-spt-0511-northwestem-football-pat2Ol1051Olryan-field-pat-fitzgerald.
66. Nw. Univ., at 5-9, petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167.
67. Id. at 16.
68. Id. at 4-5
69. Id. at 16.
70. Id. at 6.
71. Id. at 6-8.
72. The Myth of the Student-Athlete, supra note 9, at 97-108 & 97 n.124, 99 n.127 (describing
interviews of athletes from four different teams to obtain qualitative data regarding athletes' daily
lives and describing published accounts regarding other athletes corroborating such descriptions).
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totally unrelated to the college athletes' academic duties and
obligations-the activities where University faculty and staff normally
have control over students. In fact, there are perhaps few other
principal-agent relationships where the agents are, in effect, so directly
controlled every breathing minute of their time by the hiring principal.
The college athletes receive a scholarship valued at up to $76,000
per year.73 College athletes who are granted permission to live off
campus receive an additional stipend.74 This scholarship provided by
Northwestern University to the college athletes unmistakably constitutes
payment for valuable services rendered, in spite of what Northwestern
University argued to the Region. 7 5 Region 13 correctly determined that
although "the players do not receive a paycheck in the traditional sense,
they nevertheless receive a substantial economic benefit for playing
football." 76 In fact, it is not only payment, but also likely an inadequate
one, which explains why the college athletes want to form a union.
Professors McCormick and McCormick generally call the compensation
received by college athletes a "scrip," in allusion to coupons given to
workers of the company towns of a former era, as consideration for
work, to be used only in the company stores to buy things at inflated
prices.77
Northwestern University argues that the scholarship given to
college athletes is not payment for services rendered but "financial
aid."78 To sustain its argument, Northwestern University argues that the
college athletes' scholarship is not determined by their performance on
the field. 7 9 Rather, it is merely an incentive that allows the college
athletes to pursue an academic degree while playing football for
Northwestern University.so In this manner, Northwestern University
argued that college athletes are similar to graduate student research and
teaching assistants under Brown University.81 In Brown, a Bush II-era
Board decided that graduate student research and teaching assistants
were not employees under the Act because they were "primarily

73. Nw. Univ., at 14, petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167.
74. Id.
75.

Employer-Appellant's Brief to the Board on Review of Regional Director's Decision and

Direction of Election at 34, Nw. Univ. v. Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n (CAPA), Case No. 13-RC121359 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Employer's Briefto Board].
76. Nw. Univ., at 14,petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167.
77. The Myth ofthe Student-Athlete, supra note 9, at 78 n.27 (2006).
78. Employer's Brief to Board, supra note 75, at 35-36, 42-43.
79. Id. at 35.
80. Id.
81. See id.; Brown Univ. v. Int'l Union, 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 487 (2004).
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students" in pursuit of an academic degree. 82 The Board reached this
determination in part because the graduate students received fellowships
Their teaching or research
and stipends to pursue academic studies.
assistance work was part of their academic degree requirements.84 In
this case, however, the football services the athletes provide in exchange
for their scholarships are unrelated to their degree requirements and
Those valuable services on the football field are
courses of study.
completely outside of and unrelated to any classroom obligations the
athletes have. 86 Moreover, as already argued by other scholars, Brown 's
focus on the academic relevance of the services rendered by graduate
teaching and research assistants actually bolsters the college athletes'
claims stating that they are employees. 87 The Board in Brown focused
on the minimal amount of time that the graduate students spent on
teaching and research assistantships, in contrast to their time working in
pursuit of their degrees, which contrasts starkly with the excessive time
college athletes spend on the field and not in the classroom.8 8 Moreover,
in Brown, financial assistance was provided in exchange for work that
the graduate students needed for completion of their degrees, while
playing football lies totally outside college athletes' degree
In fact, no college faculty member supervises the
requirements.
athletic services provided by the college athletes, a fact true generally as
in the case at hand at Northwestern University. 90 Finally, and most
damaging to Northwestern University's claim that the scholarship is not
consideration for athletic services, is that the college athletes can lose
their scholarship if they voluntarily stop playing football for
The fact that playing football for
Northwestern University.9
Northwestern University is a term of their scholarship completely
undermines the university's claim that the scholarship is not
compensation for playing football. Finally, while the scholarships are
unconnected to the college athletes' performance on the field during

82. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 487.
83. Id. at 488.
84. Id.
85. Nw. Univ. v. Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n (CAPA), Case No. 13-RC-121359, at 18
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014), petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015), availableat
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.
86.
87.

Id.; see Fram & Frampton, supra note 32, at 1035-36.
Fram & Frampton, supra note 32, at 1035-36.

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1036; Nw. Univ., at 19, petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167.
Nw. Univ., at 4, 11, 20, petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167.
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their college years, Northwestern University offered the scholarship
based on the promise of great athletic potential and prior achievements
on the field during high school.92 Moreover, merely missing practices
could be considered a voluntary withdrawal from the team, which can
lead to revocation of the scholarship.93
The fact that the college athletes are receiving payment mostly in
kind, rather than in money, is also irrelevant in this case. When
''compensation" is discussed by the Supreme Court's labor
jurisprudence, for example, it is only described as "financial or other
compensation."9 4 Separating "other compensation" from "financial"
clearly suggests that the compensation need not be in money.
Employees can be compensated in multiple forms, such as with a
scholarship or "scrip." 9 5 In fact, in Seattle Opera, the NLRB determined
that a group of 100-200 auxiliary choristers were employees under the
NLRA even though they were merely opera aficionados called in for
occasional rehearsals and performances.96 The Board determined that
the key element that compensation establishes is whether or not the
putative employee has a "fundamentally economic relationship" with the
employer.9 7 In Seattle Opera, the choristers were paid with two dress
rehearsal performance tickets and $214 per performance to defray
parking and transportation expenses.9 To continue with the company
town analogy, no one would question that company town employees are
not employees under the Act because they are paid in scrip. In fact, if
there are any employees being paid illegally with scrip, 99 they likely
deserve, more than most other employees, union representation under
federal labor policy. 10 0

92. Id. at 9-10.
93. Id. at 16.
94. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec. Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995); Seattle Opera v.
NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Brown Univ. v. Int'l Union, 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 496
(2004).
95.

See supra text accompanying note 77.

96. Seattle Opera Ass'n v. Am. Guild Musical Artists, 331 N.L.R.B. 1072, 1073 (2000).
97. Id. at 1074 (citing WBAI Pacifica Found. v. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers Am.
(UE), 328 N.L.R.B. 1273, 1275 (1999)).
98. Seattle Opera Ass'n, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1072.
99. The Department of Labor has stated in its regulations that: "Scrip, tokens, credit cards,
'dope checks,' coupons, and similar devices are not proper mediums of payment under the Act.
They are neither cash nor 'other facilities' within the meaning of section 3(m) [of the Fair Labor

.

Standards Act]." 29 C.F.R. § 531.34; see also 29 U.S.C. § 203 (m) (2012) (defining wages under
the Fair Labor Standards Act as payments in the form of cash, and, to the extent customary, in the
form of "board, lodging, or other facilities . .
100. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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B. The College Athletes are Economically Dependent on the University
The NLRB has also looked at the "economic realities" to determine
employee status.' 0 1 The economic realities test entails determining "the
degree to which putative employees are economically dependent upon
an employer."' 02
The economic realities test, in this fashion,
complements the right of control test.'0 3 The college athletes in this case
are without a doubt economically dependent on Northwestern
University, as they are entirely reliant on the university scholarship to
attend school, live in a dorm, and eat at the school cafeteria.1 0 4 If they
live off campus and receive a stipend, they are also at the mercy of the
university-provided stipend to pay for personal necessities, such as
housing. 0 5
University rules that ban any compensation for the college players
related to their athletic abilities leave college athletes further dependent
upon Northwestern University. 106 The control exerted over almost every
minute of their lives while playing for Northwestern University makes
college athletes incapable of realistically seeking any other type of
employment. Especially given the modest background of most college
athletes, college athletes cannot, in all likelihood, secure food, housing,
clothing, and any other basic necessities that they may require without
their university scholarships and stipends.' 0 7 They are as "dependent" as
workers may come.
Moreover, the scholarship is directly tied to the college athlete's
status as a football player: if the player decides to quit the football team
or if the coaching staff decides that the player is not following the
university's mandated team rules, the college athlete will lose his
scholarship. 0 8 Having lost the means to compensation, the college
athlete will then have to find employment elsewhere to support himself
and/or to continue his education at Northwestern University.
Undoubtedly, the grant-in-aid college athletes are dependent on the
university.

101.

The Myth ofthe Student-Athlete, supranote 9, at 91-92.

102. Id. at 92.
103. Id. (citing A. Paladini, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 952, 952 (1967)).
104. Nw. Univ. v. Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n (CAPA), Case No. 13-RC-121359, at 3
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014), petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.

105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 4.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

15

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 3
316

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 32:301

C. College Athletes Relationship with Northwestern University is not
one that is PrimarilyEducational
A third test to determine employee status is the "primary purpose
test," which entails establishing whether the employee in question has
primarily an economic relationship with the employer or has some other
kind of relationship, such as that of "student."l 09 This "primary purpose
test" tends to become more salient in educational settings where the
putative employees are students of an institution and, concurrently, work
for it.' 10 Because of this rather different setting from that of the
traditional industrial one, the Supreme Court has held that "principles
developed for use in the industrial setting cannot be 'imposed blindly on
the academic world.""
One of the most recent and most salient NLRB decisions dealing
with the question of students who are also putative employees is Brown
University.112 The question in Brown that triggered the need to apply
this primary purpose test was whether graduate student research and
teaching assistants and proctors were employees under the NLRA."3
Reversing New York University"14 (NYU), where the Board had
determined that graduate students could be considered employees under
the Act, and applying earlier Board law" 5 -prior to NYU-the Board
determined that the graduate students in question were not employees
under the Act because they had a primarily educational, not economic,
relationship with their university.' 6 The Board based its decision in

109. See The Myth of the Student-Athlete, supra note 9, at 95 (citing Brown Univ. v. Int'l
Union 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 488-89 (2004)).
110. Id. at 95-96.
111. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 680-81 (1980) (citing Syracuse Univ. v. Syracuse
Univ. Ch., Am. Ass'n Univ. Professors 204 N.L.R.B. 641, 643 (1973)).
112. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 483 (2004).
113. Seeid.
114. Id. at 487.
115. See N.Y. Univ. v. Int'l Union, 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1208-09 (2000), overruled by Brown
Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004); see, e.g., St. Clare's Hosp. v. Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1002
(1977), overruled by Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp. v. House Officers' Ass'n/Comm. of Interns & Residents,

330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999); Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Cedars-Sinai Housestaff Ass'n, 223 N.L.R.B.
251, 251 (1976), overruled by Bos. Med Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999); Leland Stanford
Junior Univ. v. Stanford Union of Research Physicists, 214 N.L.R.B. 621, 623 (1974); Adelphi
Univ. v. Adelphi Univ. Chapter, Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 639-40 (1972)
(illustrating that these cases held, even before Brown Univ. was decided, that students would not be
considered employees under the Act, in line with the decision reached in Brown years later; the two
cases which were overruled are used here just to show that cases before Brown ruled in a similar
manner).

116. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 487.
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Brown on the grounds that the graduate students must first be enrolled at
their university to be awarded a teaching or research assistance position,
or to be proctors.'"7 The graduate students also only spent a limited
number of hours performing their teaching, research or proctor duties;
they spent most of their time being a "student."" 8 Also, their assistance
or proctor duties were "core elements of the Ph.D. degree.""9 Finally,
the money they received was not "consideration for work" but financial
aid to pursue their degrees, including that related to teaching assistance,
research assistance and proctoring.1 2 0
Region 13 determined that Brown is inapplicable to the
Northwestern University case because football is simply unrelated to the
degree requirements of the college athletes.121 Different from Brown,
the college athletes are not pursuing any academic pursuits when playing
on the field or practicing for it 40-60 hours per week.1 22 Region 13 was
correct in reaching this determination.
Even if Brown applied, the college athletes must be considered
employees under the Act, for reasons already argued.1 23 The athletic
activities of the college athletes are not academic.' 2 4 They are part of an
economic arrangement with Northwestern University, as stated in their
"tender" to play football and be supervised and controlled by
Northwestern University in very specific and totalizing ways in return
for a scholarship.1 25 College athletes' relationship to their student duties
in this case is essentially the same as that of the student cafeteria
workers to their academic activities. There is universal consensus that
students who work for a college or university dining hall are not
pursuing academic activities through their dining hall work and, as such,
are statutory employees.1 2 6 Playing football has no more relationship to
students' aspirations to become doctors or lawyers than working in the
dining hall.
117. Id. at488.
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Nw. Univ. v. Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n (CAPA), Case No. 13-RC-121359, at 18,
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 26. 2014), petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC- 121359.
122. See id.
123.

See discussion supra Part 1.

124. See Nw. Univ., at 18, petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167.
125. Employer's Brief to Board, supra note 75, at 6-7; Nw. Univ., (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014), at
4-9.
126. See Martin H. Malin, Student Employees and Collective Bargaining, 69 KY. L.J. 1, 5
(1980-81).
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One could argue that the case at hand would be a closer case if the
college athletes were majoring in physical education and playing
football was explicitly part of their academic requirements. But even
there, they would be considered employees under the NLRA under
Boston Medical Center Corporation.l27 In Boston Medical Center
Corporation, the Board determined that medical residents and interns
were employees even though their work was explicitly tied to their
education and training as doctors. 128 Therefore, Brown not only does not
preclude finding the college athletes to be employees under the Act, but
Board law, such as Boston Medical Center, provides for a finding of
employee status in the case at hand.
II. THE ACT'S PURPOSE TO EQUALIZE BARGAINING RELATIONSHIPS AND
MAINTAIN INDUSTRIAL PEACE WOULD BE FRUSTRATED IF THE
COLLEGE ATHLETES ARE NOT GRANTED EMPLOYEE STATUS

While the college athletes in this case are employees under the
common law control test, the economic realities test, and the primary
purpose test, they are also the kinds of individuals that the Act more
generally aims to protect: those who are providing a valuable service to a
more powerful party, and are engaged in disputes over the terms and
conditions of their work with that more powerful party, leading to
industrial strife. 129 First, it is transparent from the facts determined by
Region 13, prior studies, and from general knowledge of contemporary
college football that commercial relationships have usurped traditional
roles in universities, principally in college football, even as college
athletes attempt to obtain an education from their university. 3 0 In fact,
by extending employee status to the college athletes, the NLRB would
enable the college athletes not only to bargain with Northwestern over

127. Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp. v. House Officers' Ass'n 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 152 (1999).
128. Id.
129. Seattle Opera Ass'n v. Am. Guild Musical Artists, 331 N.L.R.B. 1072, 1074 (2000)
("[T]he Act addresses the 'fundamentally economic relationship' between employers and
employees, and states as policy that equality of bargaining power in this relationship, through

collective bargaining, 'safeguards commerce from the harm caused by labor disputes.').
130. Tomassetti, supra note 5, at 816 ("In performing the same activities, the worker
simultaneously produces saleable services for an organization (patient care, undergraduate teaching,

and building cleaning) and receives services from that organization
education, and rehabilitation). In the act of consuming labor power that
from students, for example, the university 'sells' graduate students
service-in its status as a public goods provider-and as a commodity

(medical training, graduate
the university has purchased
education, both as a social
enhancing students' lifetime

earning capacity.").
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the terms and conditions of their duties on the field, but also the extent
of such status with the university so that they have enough time in their
day to really be "students."l 3 1 In this manner, collective bargaining can
actually help to strengthen the college athlete's student status and the
NCAA's purported educational goals. Second, the kinds of concerns
that the college athletes have been voicing, which have led to strife in
the industry, e.g., inadequacy of compensation, hours of work, medical
insurance, and health and safety, are precisely the kinds of issues that the
Act aims to resolve through collective bargaining. 13 2 Such issues impact
not only the careers of college athletes during their relationship with
Northwestern University, but also, as will be more fully explained
below, after the relationship ends and the college athletes seek
professional employment. Finally, if the Board or the courts dismissed
the college athletes' petition for a union election because they are nonemployees, it would leave these young people to bargain individually
and in an abysmally asymmetrical relationship with the university
against the clear strictures of broadly conceived federal labor policy.
A. The College FootballIndustry is a Multi-Billion DollarIndustry Full
ofLabor-ManagementConflicts Deserving ofNLRA Coverage
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in 1980 that "principles developed
for use in the industrial setting cannot be 'imposed blindly on the

131. Id. at 819 ("[C]ontemporary labor struggles over nonstandard work represent a
synchronous double movement, as struggles not only about the terms of commodification but also

over the extent of commodification."). Princeton University sociologist Viviana Zelizer has
pioneered sociological studies demonstrating that hard dichotomies between market and non-market
activities are difficult to discern empirically because people integrate market and non-market
activities in their lives and sometimes use market activities to sustain non-market aspects of their
lives. VIVIANA ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 28 (Princeton Univ. Press eds., 2005). For

example, in one of her landmark books, Zelizer showed how life insurance for children, which
during its initial years was seen as abominable by middle class sectors who thought insurance would
lead parents to kill their children to collect the money, was mostly popular among working class

-

parents who wanted to be able to afford a decent burial for their children, in the case that they died

a real possibility in those times. VIVIANA ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING
SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 114-15 (Princeton Univ. Press eds., 1985).
132. JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1342-43 (6th ed. 2012) (explaining

that compensation is a mandatory subject of bargaining under the NLRA); id. at 1352 (stating that
health and welfare and insurance plans are mandatory subjects of bargaining under the NLRA); id
at 1374 (explaining that hours are mandatory subjects of bargaining under the NLRA); id at 139092 (stating that plant rules are discipline are mandatory subjects of bargaining under the NLRA); id.
at 1400-03 & n.419 (stating that safety and health are mandatory subjects of bargaining under the
NLRA).
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academic world."' 1 3 3 However, a lot has changed in American
universities since 1980, particularly in college football, which has
become a multi-billion dollar industry with many stakeholders, including
the college athletes.1 3 4 This multi-billion dollar industry is fraught with
industrial disputes, big and small. The Act was designed to encompass
industries like football, as NFL players have long been unionized.1 35
The architects of the Act desired a more level playing field where
employees could collectively organize against what was viewed as a
much larger, much more powerful entity-the employer. Northwestern
University in this case has become exactly this type of overpowering
entity. In fact, one law student's note equates the arrangements between
universities and individual college athletes as "unconscionable
contracts" given the procedural and substantive vices they contain.1 36
Similar to other industries, the college football industry provides a
product (college football) where employers (the universities) facilitate
the making of the product, the college athletes produce the product,
marketers (the NCAA and conferences) promote the product, and
distributors (broadcasting companies including conferences) make the
product widely available to customers (the fans).
Northwestern
University has even organized with other employers to form
conglomerate organizations, such as the NCAA and conferences (the Big
Ten in the case of Northwestern University), which helps represent their
interests.1 37 In order to realize the purpose of the Act, the college
athletes must be able to exercise their right to organize.
It is no secret that college football is a highly lucrative industry
with gross revenue totaling in the billions of dollars.' 3 8 Many books and

133. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 680-81 (1980) (citing Syracuse Univ. v. Syracuse
Univ. Ch., Am. Ass'n Univ. Professors 204 N.L.R.B. 641, 643 (1973)); see also Brown Univ. v.
Int'l Union 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 487 (2004).
134.

The Myth of the Student-Athlete, supra note 9, at 76; Sperber, supra note 16, at 216

(noting that college sports should be called "College Sports Megalnc."); Yost, supra note 16, at 13
(identifying college athletes as an "entertainment product").
135. See Company Overview of National Football League Players Associaiton, BLOOMBERG

BUSINESS

(Feb.

16,

2015,

2:52

PM),

http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapld=4291220.
136. Robert John Givens, "Capitamateuralism": An Examination of the Economic
Exploitation of Student Athletes by the National CollegiateAthletic Association, 82 UMKC L. REV.

205, 218-22 (2013).
137. See The Myth of the Student Athlete, supra note 9, at 83-86 (arguing that the "veil of
amateurism" surrounding collegiate sports has enabled revenue generating sports such as college
football to become the money making machines that they are, while leaving the athletes with little
or no monetary benefit from their labors).

138.

Sean Gregory, Should This Kid Be Making $225,047 A Year for Playing College
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articles have already described the intense commercialization of college
sports, from economists such as Andrew Zimbalist, who wrote Unpaid
Professionals,'3 9 to legal scholars such as McCormick and McCormick,
who wrote The Myth of the Student Athlete.1 40 Much more recently,
Judge Claudia Wilken of the Federal District Court for the Northern
District of California held in O'Bannon that the NCAA is not exempt
from antitrust regulations and, therefore, cannot ban players from
profiting from their names, images, and likenesses.141 In O'Bannon,
"The NCAA assert[ed] that the challenged restrictions on student-athlete
compensation are reasonable because they are necessary to preserve its
tradition of amateurism, maintain competitive balance among FBS
football and Division I basketball teams, promote the integration of
academics and athletics, and increase the total output of its product."
However, citing the work of professional economists who have studied
college sports, the court disagreed with the NCAA, including its
arguments regarding amateurism, because the commercial realities of the
sports simply did not jibe with the stated amateur purposes of the
NCAA. 143
The facts establishing the commercialization of revenue-generating
sports such as college football are indisputable. In 2010, college football
generated over $2 billion in revenue and $1.1 billion in profit.'44 A
recent Time magazine article reported that college football players could
be paid about $225,000 by their respective universities. 145 However,
NCAA rules forbid such payment.146 In the case at hand, all that the

Football?, TIME, Sep. 16, 2013, at 36.
139. ZIMBALIST, supra note 16, at 92 ("Princeton president Harold Dodds criticized Yale's
deal as 'unfortunate' for submitting to the 'commercial atmosphere which already surrounds
intercollegiate athletics to a troublesome degree."').

140.

The Myth of the Student-Athlete, supra note 9, at 71 ("In addressing the statutory

definition of the term employee, we demonstrate that the relationship between these athletes and
their universities is not primarily academic, but is, instead, undeniably commercial.").

141. See O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
142. Id. at 973.
143. Id. at 1000 (citing Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1099 (7th Cir. 1992)) (Flaum, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The NCAA continues to purvey, even in this case, an
outmoded image of intercollegiate sports that no longer jibes with reality. The times have
changed."). "Accordingly, the Supreme Court's incidental phrase in Board of Regents does not
establish that the NCAA's current restraints on compensation are precompetitive and without less
restrictive alternatives." O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1000.
144. DOUG J. CHUNG, THE DYNAMIC ADVERTISING EFFECT OF COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 5

(2013).
145. Gregory, supra note 138, at 36.
146. Nw. Univ. v. Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n (CAPA), Case No. 13-RC-121359, at 14,
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 26. 2014), petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015), available at
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university provides to the college athletes is a scholarship worth up to
$76,000 a year. 14 7
The lopsided bargain between the players and the universities have
led to a number of high profile disputes, including that between Texas
A&M University and one of its star players, Johnny Manziel, who was
suspended for one half-game for allegedly accepting money for signing
autographs, a violation of NCAA rules.1 4 8
College football is huge business. The total fan base of college
football is 103 million people, which represents approximately one-third
of the United States population.1 49 College football is currently the third
most popular sport in the United States, more popular than professional
basketball and professional hockey.so Eleven percent of Americans
claim college football is their favorite sport.' This number is even
higher in certain parts of the country: seventeen percent of the U.S.
South claims college football as its favorite sport.' 5 2 In fact, nine college
football teams are considered even more popular than their professional
counterparts in the same region.' 5 Like other industries, the college
football system works hard to maintain its massive and dedicated fan
base through television and other media. More than 213 million people
watched college football on television during the 2011 season, and
approximately 127 million viewers watched at least one of the thirty-five
bowl games. 154 College football games are televised on every major

http://www.nlrb.gov/case/l 3-RC- 121359.
147. See id.
148. Half-game Penalty for
Johnny Manziel,
ESPN
(Aug.
29,
2013),
http://m.espn.go.com/ncf/story?storyld=9609389&localld=dal&lang=ES&wjb=.
149. Chung, supra note 144, at 6.
150. Regina A. Corso, As American as Mom, Apple Pie and Football?,HARRIS POLLS (Jan. 16,
2014),
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/tabid/447/mid/1 508/articleld/1 365/ctl/Rea
dCustom%20Default/Default.aspx.
15 1. Id.
152. Id.
153.

Amy Daughters,

7 Teams That Are More Popular Than Their NFL Counterparts,

BLEACHER SPORTS (June 16, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/737969-college-football-7teams-that-are-more-popular-than-their-nfl-counterparts/page/2 (listing Tennessee, Arizona/Arizona
State, Michigan, Ohio State, Georgia, Florida, North Carolina/South Carolina as the regions in
which college football teams are considered even more popular than their professional
counterparts).
154. College Football Maintains Impressive Ratings and Attendance Figures, NAT'L

FOOTBALL
FOUND.
(Mar.
8,
2012,
7:53
PM),
http://www.footballfoundation.org/tabid/567/article/51405/College-Football-Maintains-ImpressiveRatings-and-Attendance-Figures.aspx. A "bowl game" is a college football playoff game. Id.
Teams must qualify to play in a bowl game, and can only play in one per season. Id.
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national sports network, including ESPN, NBC, ABC, CBS, and Fox, as
well as regional and local outlets.15 5 The separate football conferences
have even created their own networks, including Northwestern
University's conference, the Big Ten.' 5 6 The university's football team
was the twentieth most watched football team in 2013, with almost 2.7
million viewers per game. 57 This included the most watched game for
the week of October 3, when Northwestern University's football team
played Ohio State and attracted 7,360,000 viewers.' 58 The immense
television popularity of college football shows that the college football
industry utilizes the traditional media outlets that other industries do, and
that multiple media companies profit off of the college athletes in this
case, as from all college athletes.
The marketing campaigns also succeed in bringing in large crowds
of spectators. In 2011, nearly fifty million spectators purchased tickets
to watch college athletes play in the many college football stadiums
across the country.' 59 That same year, the bowl games alone attracted
1,765,224 fans to the stadiums.1 6 0 The highest-attended bowl, the Rose
Bowl, sold 91,245 tickets, continuing its sell-out streak dating back to
1947.161 The bowl games paid out a total of $282 million to all the
schools and their respective sports conferences.' 62 Also, an estimated
$1.6 billion was generated from travel and tourism because of the
college football bowl games.' 63
On December 31, 2011, Northwestern University's football team
played Texas A&M's football team in the Meineke Car Care Bowl of
Texas at the Reliant Stadium in Houston.'" Nearly 70,000 tickets were
sold; this was the sixth highest attendance of all thirty-five bowl
games.165 Nearly four million viewers tuned in to watch the game on
television.1 66 The university was paid $1.7 million for having its college
athletes play in the Meineke Car Care Bowl, despite losing the game and

155. See id.
156. See id
MEDIA
WATCH
(2014),
College Football TV Ratings, SPORTS
157. See
http://www.sportsmediawatch.com/college-football-tv-ratings/2/.
158. Id.
159. College FootballMaintains Impressive Ratings and Attendance Figures, supra note 154.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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finishing with a mediocre six wins and six losses for the season.167
Northwestern University also generates revenue and school
publicity from selling numerous types of football merchandise.' 6 ' The
University's "official school store" is not on the school's non-profit
website, but instead on CBS Sports College Network's for-profit site. 169
At that site, a consumer can purchase anything from Northwestern
University's football jerseys ($89.95), helmets ($299.99), t-shirts ($45),
and even Northwestern child football jerseys ($59.95).170 Consumers
can also buy numerous other types of paraphernalia, such as football
flags ($34.99), dog treats ($6.98), and mouse pads ($9.99). ' All items
sold prominently display "Northwestern Football" on them. 17 2 Other
major companies, such as Under Armour and Fanatics, also advertise
and sell Northwestern University's football merchandise directly
through their websites. 173
There are even video games made featuring the likeness of the
college athletes. 174 The NCAA and EA Sports, a major video game
company, recently settled a lawsuit with college basketball and football
players for profiting off the likeness of the employees in NCAA-branded
video games. 75 EA Sports paid $40 million to the players, while the
NCAA paid $20 million under the settlement agreements.176 O'Bannon
v. NCAA et al, referenced above, also dealt with the issue of college
athletes' inability to profit from their image.' 7 7 The university's college
athletes have been featured in such games in the past; the most recent
video game features Kain Colter, one of the key leaders of the College
Athletes Players Association (CAPA), performing his "signature football

167.

Patrick Vint, 2013 Texas Bowl, Minnesota v. Syracuse: TV Time, Team Profiles and

More, SBNATION, http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2013/12/8/5053242/texas-bowl-2013syracuse-minnesota-tv-schedule (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
168. The Official Online Store of the Northwestern

Wildcats,

CBS

SPORTS,

http://shop.cbssports.com/CBSNorthwestern_Wildcats (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172.
173.

Id.
See

Northwestern

Wildcats

http://www.fanatics.com/COLLEGENorthwesternWildcats

Shop,

(last

visited

FANATICS,

Mar.

2,

2015);

Northwestern Wounded Warrior Uniforms, UNDER ARMOUR, https://www.underarmour.com/en-

us/college-fan-gear/northwestern (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
174.

Ben Strauss & Steve Eder, N.C.A.A. Settles One Video Game Suit for $20 Million as a

Second Begins, N.Y. Times, June 10, 2014, at B11.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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move."178 These massive settlements and the O'Bannon case show that
other large corporations, like EA Sports, are willing to pay the college
athletes tremendous amounts of money, generating further possibilities
of industrial disputes over pay and terms and conditions of employment
in revenue-generating college sports.
B. The College Athletes' Demands are Typical of Statutory Employees
and are Suitablefor Resolution through Collective Bargaining
The college athletes, employees in an admittedly non-standard
relationship, have similar workplace demands as employees in standard
employment contracts. However, they have limited opportunities to
have their voices heard, absent "labor strife."' 79 The Act was enacted
with the purpose of allowing employees to have a voice without
necessarily resorting to such labor strife. 80 Nearly every potential
demand is something that has already been bargained for in other
professions, particularly by the NFL players' union (NFLPA).'s' In fact,
one of the driving forces behind the college athletes demanding a unionhaving protection from football-related injuries that are not felt until
later in life, such as concussions-is also the biggest issue that the
NFLPA currently has with the NFL.1 8 2 The schools have organized their
power via the NCAA, expanding their already great power.' 8 3 The
college athletes must be allowed to have an answer to Northwestern
University's organization with one of their own.184
The college athletes are subject to traditional disciplinary measures,
and must be able to bargain over what the terms of discipline are.' 85 The

178.

Rodger Sherman, Keeping it Real with EA Sports: Venric Mark, Kain Colter, and the

Option, SBNATION (July 19, 2013), http://www.sippinonpurple.com/northwestem-wildcatsfootball/2013/7/19/4537598/venric-mark-kain-colter-option-northwestem-wildcats-football.
179. See Nw. Univ. v. Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n (CAPA), Case No. 13-RC-121359, at 15-17
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 26. 2014), petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015), availableat
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.
180. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
181.

See Eisenband,'supra note 44.

182.

Id.

183.

See supra note 16.

184.

See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) ("That is a

fundamental right. Employees have as clear a right to organize and select their representatives for
lawful purposes as the respondent has to organize its business and select its own officers and
agents.").

185. See Nw. Univ. v. Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n (CAPA), Case No. 13-RC-121359, at 2, 4,
14 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014), petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015), available
at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.
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team handbook and the tender signed by the college athletes lay out
strict guidelines that determine what they can be punished for and what
the punishment may be.' 86 The punishments could result in loss of
compensation, suspension from the team, or even being terminated."'
These are common disciplinary measures in traditional employment
relationships. If a college athlete is tardy or fails to show up, discipline
will result.' 88
College athletes may even be disciplined for
"embarrassing" the team.1 89 Such blanket, vague terms are a major.
reason why employees bargain for more explicit terms in collective
bargaining contracts; employees generally want to know what they can
and cannot do so they may avoid being disciplined.' 9 0 Just to name one
prominent example, former Texas A&M quarterback Johnny Manziel
was suspended for half a game for allegedly accepting money for
signing autographs, a violation of NCAA rules.' 9' This punishment
came despite the NCAA, which is entirely self-regulated, having no
evidence to support the charge.1 92 The university's ability to discipline
mirrors that of other industries, and the college athletes here must have
the right to voice concern over what disciplinary action can be instituted
for and the measures imposed.
The college athletes are also subjected to stringent work schedules,
and like other employees, should have a say in their hours worked.' 93
Being able to bargain over hours and schedules is a major and common
subject of collective bargaining.1 9 4 The hours that the college athletes
are subjected to are a major point of contention.195 The college athletes
must work, during certain parts of the year, up to sixty hours per

186. Id. at 14.
187. Id. at 4, 15-17.
188. Id. at 4.
189. Id.
190. See Alan Ritchey, Inc. v. Warehouse Union Local 6, 354 N.L.R.B. 628, 629 (illustrating
that an employer must bargain with union no-talking rules that impinge on discipline); N.K. Parker
Transport, Inc. v. Local 283, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 332 N.L.R.B. 547, 551 (2000)
(internal citations omitted) (establishing that an employer must bargain with union rules regarding
termination and reinstatement).
191. See Half-game Penaltyfor Johnny Manziel, supra note 148.

192. Id.
193. See Nw. Univ. v. Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n (CAPA), Case No. 13-RC-121359, at 4-8
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014), petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.
194. Alan Ritchey, 354 N.L.R.B. at 629 (establishing that an employer must bargain
scheduling issues with the union).
195. See Nw. Univ., at 9, petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167.
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week.196 The college athletes have little say in when they must work;
Northwestern University schedules the games, and besides having
minimal say in moving practices because of classes, the college athletes
work at the whim of the management-imposed schedule. 19 7 The team
handbook states that academics will take precedence over athletic
employee duties.198 However, in most cases, Northwestern University
refuses to relax training and other schedules because of classes.1 99 In
refusing to grant the college athletes any say in their schedule, this
clause in the handbook is severely diluted. The college athletes should
have a mechanism available to enforce this handbook provision. Like
statutory employees with standard employment contracts, the college
athletes should have the right to negotiate with Northwestern University
the amount of time that they spend in football-related activities. Both
items fall squarely under the "terms and conditions of employment" for
employees.
Moreover, there is the key issue of compensation.
argued elsewhere, compensation is:

As we have

one of the more traditional terms and conditions of employment that
employees have a right to bargain over. Here, the issue is not simply
the amount of compensation they will receive, but whether they have
the right to receive compensation at all, even if from third parties.
[Northwestern University] may have the right to restrict who the
[college athletes] can do business with, but [the university] should not
be able to prohibit all business without first having to meaningfully
negotiate [with the players]. For example, in collective bargaining
negotiations, the [college athletes] may agree not to do business with
Nike because the [university] has an endorsement deal with Under
Armour. 200

A full prohibition on any kind of compensation with anyone is
overly restrictive, and almost promises labor strife, as we have seen in
the video game and signature disputes.2 01 College athletes should have a
196. See id. at 4-9.
197. See id. at 5-9.
198. Id. at 12.
199. Id. at 11.
200. Labor Law Professors' Brief, supra note 45, at 22. The content of this quotation is the
original work of the authors, C6sar F. Rosado Marzan and Alex Tillett-Saks, and can also be found
in the cited source.
201. See Strauss & Eder, supra note 174, at B ll (discussing video game disputes); see also
Half-game penalty for Johnny Manziel, supra note 148 (discussing a dispute involving a college
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say in how restrictive such policies can be. Furthermore, the penalties
for profiting from their football abilities and activities can be very
severe. 20 2 Northwestern University's college athletes must be able to
negotiate how they may obtain compensation for their skills. There is
obviously a huge market for the college athletes' images and likeness,
and the University and other universities are collectively profiting off of
203
such images and likeness.20 Coaches certainly make lots of money off
the ventures they sign with sneaker brands and others.204 College
athletes currently have no meaningful ability to negotiate such terms and
conditions of their employment.205
Football is also an inherently dangerous sport, and players must
have the ability to negotiate issues that affect their safety, such as health
insurance, equipment, reduction in the number of full-contact practices,
and rule changes. Concussions are an ever-increasing worry with
06
football, and the NCAA has simply passed the buck to the schools.2
Two hundred concussions were reported in college football last season,
and this number would likely be higher if all concussions were actually
reported.207 After Kain Colter suffered a concussion last season, his
coach was extremely lax about getting him rest. 20 8 Only three days after
Colter was concussed, the coach stated, "I doubt he's going to get any
reps today, but he'll be out there at practice and from there we'll see
how the week progresses." 209 It is important for the college athletes to

athlete signing autographs).

202. Adario Strange, Judge Rules NCAA Can't Stop Athletes From Profiting From College
Sports, MASHABLE (Aug. 9, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/08/09/ncaa-athletes-profit/.
203. See Chung, supra note 144, at 5 (stating that in 2010, college football generated over $2
billion in revenue and $1.1 billion in profit).
204.

See Matthew Kish, 5 Examples of How Nike, Adidas Own College Athletics, PORTLAND

JOURNAL

Bus.

(Aug.

30,

2013,

7:13

AM),

http://www.bizjoumals.com/portland/blog/threadsandlaces/2013/08/five-surprises-ncaa-nike-

adidas-contract.html?page=all (mentioning Michigan State Men's basketball coach Tom Izzo's
$400,000 per year Nike deal as an example).
205.
206.

See supra text accompanying note 200.
Ken Reed, NCAA's Approach to Concussions is Barbaric, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 14,

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ken-reed/ncaa-footballAM),
5:12
2013,
concussions b 3757585.html.
207. Timothy Bella, NCAA Head Games: The 'Very Skewed' Concussion Data in College
Football,
ALJAZEERA
AMERICA
(Jan.
9,
2014,
5:30
PM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/america-tonight-blog/2014/I/9/ncaa-

head-games-theveryskewedconcussiondataincollegefootball.html.
208. See Patrick Stevens, Northwestern Football: QuarterbackKain Coulter Remains Day-toDay with Concussion, SYRACUSE.COM (Sept. 3, 2013, 3:11 PM), http://www.syracuse.com/patrickstevens/index.ssfl2013/09/northwestern footballquarterb.html.

209. Id.
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have the right to negotiate with Northwestern University regarding
issues pertaining to their health and safety. In fact, being protected from
such injuries is perhaps the college athletes' most urgent bargaining
subject. 2 10 According to Kain Colter, one of the leading college athletes
who tried to organize the Northwestern University team, the concern is
not just when the concussions happen, but also fear over the lasting
effects of playing football; as he publicly stated:
There needs to be a guarantee that players aren't stuck with medical
bills after they leave with long-lasting injuries that they suffer from
football .... Essentially, they're hurt on the job and then they're stuck
with the medical bills if they do need a surgery down the line. That's
211
one of the biggest things.
Concern at Northwestern University ran so high that one of the
school's former college athletes was one of two named plaintiffs in a
class action lawsuit against the NCAA for its lack of concussion
This former player claims he suffers concussion-like
policies. 2 12
taking numerous hits while playing football for
from
symptoms
Northwestern University from 2004-08.213 When the risks to the college
athletes are so high, they must have the ability to protect themselves by
negotiating with the university about what can be done. This type of
protection strikes at the college athletes' right to bargain for a safe
workplace, and thus strikes at a core purpose of the Act.
C. The College Athletes Must be ProtectedBecause their Employment
with Northwestern University Has an Indelible Mark on their Ability to
Get Hired by the NFL
The Division I college football system that the university and
college athletes belong to serves to funnel players into the NFL. How
the players perform while playing for Northwestern University has a
drastic effect on whether, and in what order, they may be drafted into the
NFL, and what their starting salary will be.2 14 For example, the first

210. See Eisenband, supra note 44 (explaining how a system, such as a trust, should be put in
place to compensate the athletes down the road).

211.

Id.

212. Philip Rossman-Reich, Former Northwestern Lineman at Front of NCAA Concussion
Battle, LAKE THE POSTS (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.laketheposts.com/2011/09/30/northwestern-

concussion-battle-092911.
213. Id.
214.

See Jason Belzer, 2014 NFL Draft 1st Round Rookie Salary Projections,FORBES (May 9,
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overall pick of the 2014 NFL draft is projected to sign a four-year deal
worth $22,272,988, the player selected tenth overall is projected to sign
a $12,249,149 deal, and the player selected thirty-second overall (the
end of the first round) is projected to sign a deal worth $6,849,502.215
Players are drafted based, in large part, on how they performed in
college. Thus, the amount of compensation college athletes ultimately
receive for football-related activities post-college is directly tied to their
performance in the college system, over Which the university has
control, as discussed earlier.2 16
Furthermore, a college athlete can drop significantly in the NFL
draft based on the university's disciplinary determinations or general
reports of the player's "character."217 As the gateway to the NFL,
Northwestern University's evaluation of a college athlete has a
considerable effect on his draft status.218 For example, one college
athlete from Oklahoma, Stacy McGee, was recruited as a top highschool player in the country at his position.219 However, due to multiple
suspensions issued by his university, one as vague as "for violating
university rules in the preseason," his draft prospects sank.220
NFL.com's scouting report cited his weaknesses as "multiple off-thefield incidents; suspensions," and his "bottom line [was]: McGee has all
the physical attributes to be a contributor.. . . However, between a lack
of production throughout his career, multiple off the field incidents, and
suspensions, he is unlikely to be drafted." 2 2 1 McGee, once a perennial
recruit, dropped to the sixth round in the draft. 22 2 However, he later
became a central part of his NFL team's defensive line rotation.2 23 He
"was a controversial selection [due to college suspensions] for breaking
team rules," but has shown to be a good example of a player whose

2014, 7:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbelzer/2014/05/09/2014-nfl-draft-1st-roundrookie-salary-projections.

215.
216.

Id.
See discussionsupra Part II.

217. See Jerry McDonald, NFL Draft: Character a Major Part of Equation, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS (May 6, 2014, 3:16 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/raiders/ci_25709276/nfldraft-character-major-part-equation.

218.

See id.

219.

See

id.;

see

also

2013

Draft

Prospects:

Stacy

McGee,

NFL,

http://www.nfl.com/draft/201 1/profiles/stacy-mcgee?id=2539285 (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).
220.

2013 DraftProspects:Stacy McGee, supra note 219.

221.
222.

Id.
McDonald, supra note 217.

223.

Jerry McDonald, Raiders' Stacy McGee Hitting his Stride, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS

(Nov. 22, 2013, 4:29 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/raiders/ci_24582937/raiders-stacy-mcgeehitting-his-stride.
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employer-imposed disciplinary measures affected his draft status, but
who proved to be an asset to his professional team.224 Such preprofessional disciplinary action against college athletes, which may cost
college athletes their careers, only promises labor-management strife
that could be diminished through NLRA coverage and collective
bargaining.
Also, when Manziel was being investigated for receiving
compensation for autographs, it was unclear what his punishment would
be, if any.225 If a player is prohibited from showcasing his talent due to a
long suspension, it will have a dire effect on that player's draft status.
When the NCAA announced that Manziel would only be receiving a
one-half game suspension, his odds of winning the Heisman Trophy
(most valuable player in college football) increased dramatically from
12-1 to 6-1.226 Winning the Heisman and thus being considered the best
player in college football would obviously affect his NFL draft status.
Being mostly absolved of any serious wrongdoing, Manziel was drafted
in the first round of the NFL draft.2 27 Employer-imposed rules can
often, as Forbes has described, "cost[] both millions in current and future
incomes, revenues, and reputational namesake." 22 8 Particularly because
the college athletes' future career and ability to be compensated later on
in life are at stake, the college athletes must be able to negotiate for more
job security while providing their services to the university. Again,
these conflicts only promise more labor strife between a powerful and
organized employer group on one side and a non-organized voiceless
college athlete on the other side. NLRA coverage in this case is thus
warranted.

224. Id.
225.

Half-game Penaltyfor Johnny Manziel, supra note 148.

226. Id.
227. Pat McMananon, Johnny Manziel Drafted by Browns, ESPN (May 9, 2014, 12:43 PM),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/draft2014/story//id/10903195/2014-nfl-draft-johnny-manziel-draftedcleveland-browns-no-22-overall-pick.
228. Patrick Rishe, Cam-ibalized: The FinancialRepercussions of the Cam Newton Scandal,
FORBES (Nov. 10, 2010, 11:52 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2010/11/10/camibalized-the-financial-repercussions-of-the-cam-newton-scandal.
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D. The Act Must be InterpretedBroadly in Favor of GrantingEmployee
Status
The Supreme Court and Board's "broad and historic interpretation
of the Act" requires an inclusive interpretation of the statute, which
would include the college athletes under the protection of the Act. 22 9 As
noted above, Section 2(3) of the Act defines an employee as "any
employee," with certain specific exceptions; "student" is not one of
those exceptions.2 30
Furthermore, the Congressional intent of the Act is explicit in
desiring its broad coverage. 2 3 1 The Act was passed with the intention of
having significant impact on labor relations by compelling employers to
bargain with employees.232 These goals have been understood namely to
be industrial peace, collective bargaining, and rearrangement of relative
bargaining power, among others. 2 3 3 There are likely over ten thousand
football players receiving scholarships at one hundred and twenty
universities.234 Denying college athletes employee status would thus
exclude a significant number of individuals from statutory labor
protections.
Despite employer control, the economic realities and primary
purpose for which the university recruits football players-which is to
provide a valuable service-and the policies of the NLRA to protect
weaker parties to preserve industrial peace, Northwestern University
persists in its position that its college athletes are "student-athletes,"
merely students who happen to also be athletes. 235 The term "studentathlete" instills a sense of innocence, and attempts to remind us that
college athletes are not workers but are amateur players. However, this

229. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. 85, 90-92 (1995); Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 178, 192 (1941).
230. See supra text accompanying note 52; Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 160
(1999) ("[Nlothing in the statute suggests that persons who are students but also employees should
be exempted from the coverage and protection of the Act.").

23 1. Id.
232.

Karl Klare, JudicialDeradicalizationof the Wagner Act and the Originsof Modern Legal

Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 295 (1977).
233. Id. at 292-93.
234.

Ryan

Wood,

Crunching

the

Numbers:

Football

Scholarships,

ACTIVE,

http://www.active.com/football/articles/crunching-the-numbers-footballscholarships.%20Note,%20however,%20that%20most (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). Note, however,
that most college athletes in revenue generating sports play for state colleges and universities, which

means that they are covered by state labor laws, not the NLRA. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444
U.S. 672, 704 n.17 (1980); see also 29 U. S. C. § 152 (2) (2012).
235. Employer's Brief to Board, supra note 75, at 7, 11.
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term was invented in the 1950s by the NCAA as a formulaic strategy to
fight against worker's compensation insurance claims for injured
football players, many of whom were hurt, or died, while playing college
football.236
The term has worked so well for the NCAA because it has servred
the dual purpose of subordinating college athletes, convincing them to
follow the rules and orders of the university, while giving the impression
to the rest of the world that they are merely students. In response to the
college athletes' attempts to unionize and exercise their statutory rights,
the NCAA has described the college athletes' organizing drive as a
"union-backed attempt to turn student-athletes into employees." 237 The
university has stated that the college athletes should vote "no" during the
union election to "get back to being students." 2 38 But the terms
"student" and "employee" are not mutually exclusive; one can be both
simultaneously. 239 In fact, as stated above, many students are. It is
extremely common for students to work jobs, including ones in the
campus cafeteria, for example. 24 0 The difference between the student
school cafeteria worker and the football player is that there are immense
profits in college football, and Northwestern University will continue to
try to convince society that these players are "student-athletes" who have
no statutory rights. We would be nalve to think that the university, its
peers, and the NCAA will not fight tooth and nail to keep the "myth of
the student-athlete" alive. The economic stakes are too high for all the
parties involved.2 41 Unfortunately, the college athletes, who do all the
real work in this industry and produce the profits, are in a very unfair
fight to pursue their interests both as students and as exploited college

236.

The Myth of the Student Athlete, supra note 9, at 84-85.

237.

Tom Farrey, Kain Colter Starts Union Movement, ESPN (Jan. 28, 2014, 9:08 PM),

http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/ /id/I 0363430/outside-lines-northwestem-wildcats-footballplayers-trying-join-labor-union.
238. Nick Bromberg, Document Shows Northwestern's Anti-union Responses to Questions
from Players, YAHOO! SPORTS (Apr. 20, 2014, 10:41 PM), https://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/ncaaf-drsaturday/document-shows-northwestem-s-anti-union-responses-to-questions-from-players-

024103369.html.
239. See Tomassetti, supra note 5, at 818 (arguing that Democrats in the NLRB recognize the
market and non-market dimensions of employment relations and understand that labor law can help
individuals enmeshed in such contradictory relations to navigate the contradictions, in essence to
curb the more destructive aspects of commodification).
240. See Beyond the Cafeteria: Finding Fun and Educational Jobs on Campus,
COLLEGEVIEW, http://www.collegeview.com/articles/articlelbeyond-the-cafeteria-finding-fun-andeducational-jobs-on-campus (last visited May 20, 2015) (listing "dishing out pizza at the cafeteria"
as a standard job on campus for college students to hold).

241.

See supra note 203.
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athletes. They should be covered by the Act so they may organize and
be better able to play and to study.
III. THE WALK-ONS COULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED STATUTORY
EMPLOYEES

Region 13 decided that while the grant-in-aid college athletes were
employees under the Act, the walk-ons, or those college athletes who do
not receive scholarships, are not employees under the Act. 24 2 Region 13
required the existence of financial compensation in order to find
employee status.24 3 In this section we argue that Region 13 likely erred
in finding that the walk-ons were not compensated. At a minimum, the
issue of their employee status should be further studied and analyzed.
First, as stated previously, in Seattle Opera the Board determined
that choristers who were paid only with parking reimbursements and free
tickets to opera performances were employees under the Act. 24 4 The
Board determined that the underlying principle behind payment was that
there was a relationship that was "fundamentally economic."245 While
Region 13 and Northwestern University argued that the walk-ons are
merely playing for their "love of the game," there are facts that strongly
It is common for walk-ons to earn
suggest the contrary.246
scholarships. 2 47 In fact, over the last seven years, twenty-one walk-ons
have earned scholarships from Northwestern University. 248 The
employer's football team contains twenty-seven walks-ons. 24 9 Thus,
over ten percent of walk-ons seem to be awarded scholarships (three out
of every twenty-seven players). This rate gives significant hope to walkons that Northwestern University will exercise its right to award them
scholarships. As in Seattle Opera, where the choristers hoped to get a
formal position with their employer, 250 here most if not all of the walkons aspire to become grant-in-aid scholarship college athletes.
Therefore, walk-ons are not merely playing for their "love of the game,"
242. Nw. Univ. v. Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n (CAPA), Case No. 13-RC-121359, at 17
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014), petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.
243. See id.
244. See supra pp. 314-15.
245. Seattle Opera Ass'n v. Am. Guild Musical Artists, 331 N.L.R.B. 1072, 1074 (2000).
246. Nw. Univ., at 17, petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167.
247. See id. at 3 n.3.
248. Id.
249. See id at 3.
250. Seattle Opera Ass'n, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1072.
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but also for a chance to receive better compensation-a scholarship.
Moreover, Northwestern University severely limits the walk-ons'
ability to earn compensation in the same way it limits the grant-in-aid
college athletes. 25 1 Walk-ons can be forbidden by the university to earn
compensation through any means outside of its control.252 Even though
Northwestern University does not compensate walk-ons with a
scholarship, walk-ons are strictly forbidden from earning any kind of
compensation by way of their football abilities or reputation as a football
player. 2 53 Just like the grant-in-aid college athletes, walk-ons are
forbidden from profiting off of their own image and signatures.254
Walk-ons must even obtain permission from the employer to gain
employment engaging in non-football activities. 25 5
These clearly
economic terms in the relationship between walk-ons and Northwestern
University further indicate that there is a fundamental economic
relationship between the walk-ons and the University.
We should also underline that, as previously described, the Board
and the courts have applied the common law right of control test to
specify employee status.256 Citing Brown University, Region 13
specified that "an employee is (1) a person who performs services for
another under a contract of hire, (2) subject to the other's control or right
of control, and (3) in return for payment." 257 However, the Restatement

251. Nw. Univ., at 15, petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167.
252. Id. at 16.
253. Id. at 4-5.
254. Id. at 5.
255. Id. at 4.
256. Roadway Package Sys. Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 842, 849-50 (1998).
257. Nw. Univ., at 13 (citing Brown Univ. v. Int'l Union, 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490 n.27 (2004);
NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995)), petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No.
167. Region 13 relies on Town and Country and Brown to argue that compensation is required to
find employee status. Id. at 13 (citing Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 490 n.27; Town & Country
Elec., 516 U.S. at 94).

Brown cites to Town and Country in determining that the common law

definition of employee requires that the services be done "in return for financial or other
compensation." Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 496 (citing Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. at 90).
However, Town and Country does not classify compensation as a requirement for employee status.
Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. at 90. In defining employee, the Court in Town and Country cites
the American Heritage Dictionary, which mentions compensation, and the Black's Law Dictionary,
which says nothing about payment or compensation and only requires there to be "any contract for

hire, express or implied, oral or written, where the employer has the power or right to control." Id.
(citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 525 (6th ed. 1990)). The Court then goes on to emphasize that
the term employee shall be interpreted broadly and in accordance with furthering the purpose of the
Act. Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. at 91. To read in to Town and Country an imposed
requirement for compensation would be to argue that the Court relied on the American Heritage

Dictionary over the Black's Law Dictionary, the language of the NLRA, and the language of the
Restatement. Therefore, Brown, on which Region 13 relies in requiring payment, simply wrote in to
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(Second) of Agency, Section 2, says nothing about compensation. 2 5 8
The Restatement's definition of master and servant states:
(1) A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform service in
his affairs and who controls or has the right to control the physical

conduct of the other in the performance of the service.
(2) A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in
his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is
259
controlledor is subject to the right to controlby the master.

The Restatement (Second) of Agency Section 220 further defines
servant (employee), listing ten factors.260 Most of the factors relate to
control and right of control, such as control over details of the work, the
length of time employed, and whether equipment is furnished.26 1 Only
one factor-"the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job"mentions anything related to compensation.2 62 This lone factor only
suggests that being paid "by the time" supports employee status and
being paid "by the job" supports independent contractor status,
presumptively because the employer's control is more limited; it states
nothing concerning compensation as a prerequisite to employee status on
its own. 263
The issue of compensation type and amount is really the only major
difference between walk-ons and the grant-in-aid college athletes.2
In
all other respects, the walk-ons and the grant-in-aid college athletes are
essentially identical.265
Northwestern University controls the walk-ons in a way similar to
that of the grant-in-aid college athletes.266 While Region 13 found that
the walk-ons "appear" to be permitted greater flexibility than the grantin-aid college athletes with regard to academic endeavors,267 this

the definition of employee a requirement that was not laid out in the precedent case it relies on. See
Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 496.
258. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY: MASTER; SERVANT; INDEP. CONTRACTOR § 2
(1958).
259. Id. (emphasis added).
260. §§ 220(2)(a)-(j).
261. Id.
262. § 220(2)(g).
263. § 220(1) cmt. e.
264. Nw. Univ., at 20, petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167.
265. Id. at 4-5.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 17.
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appearance now screams for more facts. Some college athletes may
simply be less crucial to the team's success, suggested by the coaches'
emphasis on winning football games. Flexibility is based on football
ability and capacity to help the team win football games rather than on
scholarship status. A walk-on who is deemed critical to the team's
success may be granted less flexibility; conversely, a grant-in-aid college
athlete who is not deemed critical may be granted more flexibility.
Although there is often a correlation between football ability and
scholarship status, this may not be necessarily true. Therefore, we cannot
assume walk-ons are granted more flexibility merely because they do not
have a scholarship.
Even assuming that walk-ons were granted greater flexibility, such
flexibility would merely be one factor to consider when determining
employee status. In light of the total factual context, which the Board
must consider, Northwestern University may still exercise pervasive
control over the walk-ons. 2 6 8 Like the grant-in-aid college athletes, the
walk-ons must check with the university before they purchase and drive
certain vehicles, travel off campus during certain times, use social
media, or speak to the press, and they must also submit to drug
testing.269 Furthermore, the walk-ons are subject to the same rigorous
forty to sixty-hour schedule that the grant-in-aid college athletes are
subject to. 2 70 In fact, walk-ons may have to put forth more time to show
the proper commitment necessary to secure a spot on the team. Whereas
Northwestern University has already invested time and money in the
grant-in-aid college athletes, a walk-on must work extra hard to prove to
the university that he deserves a roster spot.
Also, the walk-ons seem to abide by an implied contract. Although
the walk-ons do not sign a so-called "tender" with the University, the
walk-ons must abide by the same rules as the grant-in-aid college
athletes. 27 1 This very likely implied contract, by which the walk-ons
must abide, places the same restrictions on walk-ons as it does grant-inaid college athletes. 2 72 The walk-ons must even formally sign a release
allowing Northwestern University to utilize their "name, likeness and

268. NLRB. v. United Ins. Co. ofAm., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968).
269. Nw. Univ., at 5, petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167.
270. Id. at 6.
271. Id. at 4.
272.

Id. at 16 ("The football coaches are able to maintain control over the [walk-on and

scholarship] players by monitoring their adherence to NCAA and team rules and disciplining them
for any violations that occur.").
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image for any purpose." 273 The walk-ons also subject themselves to
drug testing.274 These rules, which mimic those for grant-in-aid college
athletes, can be breeding grounds for industrial strife. In fact, walk-ons
have started their own litigation to combat alleged NCAA monopolistic
practices, which limit scholarships and keep the compensation of walkons at almost nothing. 275 Based on these factors, it is evident that
Northwestern University has significant control over how the walk-ons
perform their services for the university and even how they live their
lives when not engaging in football activities.
Furthermore, Northwestern University significantly controls the
ability for walk-ons to play professionally later in the NFL. Because
players must be three years removed from high school to play in the
NFL under the NFL-NFLPA collective bargaining agreement,276 playing
college football has, in effect, become a requirement to play in the NFL.
There are currently only two NFL players who did not play college
football out of nearly one thousand seven hundred professional football
players, both of which are foreign-born rugby players.277 In essence, by
deciding whether the walk-ons will continue to earn a spot on the team,
the employer is also controlling the walk-ons' future ability to play
professional football. For the walk-on player to have a chance to profit
from his football ability after college, he will have to continue to provide
his services to Northwestern University, even if they must be provided
free of charge. This exhibits substantial employer control over the walkon's ability to earn compensation later in life and demonstrates the
economic nature of the relationship between the university and the walkon player.
The ability for walk-ons to become successful NFL players is a real
possibility, further showing that walk-ons are not merely playing for
their "love of the game." 278 In fact, some of the most recognized names
in the NFL, such as J.J. Watt and Clay Matthews, were at one time
college walk-ons. 2 79 Because the employer has substantial control over

273. Id. at 5.
274. Id.
275. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 990 F.2d 996, 998
(N.D. Cal. 2013).
276. Eligibility Rules: Eligibility of New Players, NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE (2014),
available at http://www.nflregionalcombines.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). However, a college
athlete may play in the NFL after three years of playing in college football in exceptional
circumstances. Id.

277.
278.
279.

NFL Players by College, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/nfl/college (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
See Nw. Univ., at 17, petition dismissed, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167.
Mike Huguenin, JJ. Watt Among Players to go From College Walk-on to NFL Star, NFL
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the walk-ons' ability to play later in the NFL and earn compensation,
they further exhibit a right of control over the walk-ons, strongly
suggesting the walk-ons are statutory employees. 280
It is also apparent that the walk-ons are economically dependent on
the university. Even though they do not receive scholarships, if they
aspire to play professional football, they are dependent on Northwestern
University for their future careers. Here, that future career is not
contingent on the academic performance of the college athlete, but on
his performance on the field, which is in many important ways
dependent on the university.
Similarly, that relationship of an aspiring professional athlete
playing for Northwestern University, under its supervision and control,
is not one where the college athlete is primarily a student, but an
athlete.2 8
In effect, walk-ons resemble grant-in-aid college athletes in
fundamental aspects that should be further explored in this and in other
cases.
CONCLUSION

This article argues that Region 13 of the NLRB was correct to hold
that Northwestern University's grant-in-aid football players, the first
college athletes to file formally for a union election under the NLRA, are
employees under the NLRA. The NLRB and the courts should uphold
Region 13's decision and let these players choose a collective bargaining
representative, if they want one. The college athletes are employees
under the Act because they squarely meet the broad definition of
"employee" and the three tests normally used by the NLRB to determine
employee status: the "right of control test," the "economic realities test,"
and the "primary purpose test." Moreover, we have argued that the
walk-ons, or at least some of them, are likely also employees under the
Act. At least some of the walk-ons seem to maintain a "fundamentally
economic relationship" with the university because they want to be
compensated with a scholarship and play in the NFL. Walk-ons also
provide all kinds of exclusive economic rights to the universities,
including those that enable the universities to profit from their image and

(Feb. 14, 2014, 11:25 AM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap2000000323409/article/jj-wattamong-players-to-go-from-college-walkon-to-nfl-star.
280.

See supra note 257.

281.

See supra note 140.
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likeness, and which limit the walk-ons abilities to work in other
employment during the time they play for the universities' teams. 28 2
Their economic relationship should be further assessed in this case and
in others to determine their employee status. Moreover, we argue that
the policies of the Act to protect weaker parties and preserve industrial
peace through collective bargaining call for the extension of labor rights
to college athletes in revenue-generating sports, such as those in this
case.
Recognizing the labor rights of nonstandard employees such as the
Northwestern University football players would be a step in the direction
of furthering the labor rights of other groups with nonstandard working
arrangements. The problem with not recognizing the labor rights of
nonstandard employees is rampant in the U.S. and around the globe.283
For example, Professor Indira Gartenberg, an Indian scholar-activist, has
detailed some of the contemporary challenges of organizing informal
women workers in India. 28 4 Informal workers are workers who are not
legally recognized by their employers and are not covered by fiscal,
health and labor laws. 2 8 5 Despite the fact that the women workers were
laboring in difficult, "male" occupations, such as construction,
employers argued that the women were merely killing time (known in
India as "timepass") and were not considered to be performing "work"
or to be "workers." 286 One could say, borrowing the American labor law
frame that employers perceived these female workers as "primarily
women," or "primarily wives," or "primarily mothers," or "primarily
daughters," not "employees," despite the back-breaking, dangerous, and
profitable services that they provided to construction contractors.
Eventually, and after much struggle, at least some of these women have
secured worker identity cards that make it possible for them to secure
welfare assistance. 287 According to sociologist Rina Agarwala, worker
recognition cards also give women workers social legitimacy, which is

282.

Seesuprap. 335.

283. See RINA AGARWALA, INFORMAL LABOR, FORMAL POLITICS, AND DIGNIFIED
DISCONTENT IN INDIA 1 (2013) ("In most developing countries, informal labor - labor that is not

formally protected - represents the majority of the labor force.").
284. Indira Gartenberg, New Dynamics in Collective Bargaining in the Informal Sector:
Impressions from India, Paper Presented at the XVIII International Sociological Association World
Congress of Sociology in Yokohama, Japan (July 18, 2014) (noting that author, Cesar Rosado,
attended the conference).
285. AGARWALA, supra note 283, at 1.

286. Id. at 60-62.
287. See id.
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important to sustain their roles as mothers, daughters, and wives.
As
Professor Agarwala recounts in her book on informal Indian labor
movements: "The biggest benefit of the union for Badhrunisa [a female
informal worker] has been the identity card: 'This card proves that I am
a good worker. I show it at the municipal office, when I have to ask for
water. I show it when I register my daughter at the school. I show it at
the bidi workers' hospital, so I can get help faster than at the corporation
Because
hospital.
With this card, everyone knows I work."' 2 89
Badhrunisa was recognized as a worker, she could better meet her
gendered familial obligations.290
We bring up the case of female Indian informal workers to
underline the deeply cultural and shifting nature of legal employee
status. From an American perspective, the fact that a worker is a woman
is irrelevant to determine employee status. We think that the same will
apply to college athletes as they, like Indian female workers, struggle to
obtain such recognition. The employment status of "student-athletes,"
may later change as these putative employees publicize and air the
realities that they provide and are trying to change.
Collective bargaining cannot only help college athletes receive
better compensation and better terms and conditions of employment, but
it can also help them fulfill their role as students, which the university
claims college athletes "primarily" are. Through collective bargaining,
the college athletes can negotiate more flexible and less demanding
athletic schedules to attend class, labs, group discussions, and other
academic activities. Through collective bargaining, the college athletes
can get better guarantees from the university to protect their safety and
remain physically and cognitively healthy for calculus, history and
organic chemistry. Similarly, other nonstandard, precarious workers to
whom the Republican-era NLRBs have denied labor rights will be better
able to perform their roles if they are granted employee status. Disabled
janitors who are "clients" and employees of rehabilitative institutions
will be better able to protect their client status if their janitorial time and
duties are balanced. Graduate students can better attend to their own
academic work and research if they do not have to spend excessive hours
teaching and doing research for someone else, either because their
teaching and research terms are too onerous, or because they must do so
to pay rent and buy food.

288. Id.
289. Id at 61.
290. See id. at 61-62.
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Finding that college athletes are employees under the NLRA not
only makes the most sense under the federal statute, it will also provide
better chances for all nonstandard employees, who today account for one
and improve their lot while
quarter of the U.S. workforce, 291 to organize an
preserving industrial peace, as United States federal policy requires. In
terms of historical labor movement demands, recognizing that
nonstandard employees such as college athletes have labor right helps
them get bread, yes, but roses too.
EPILOGUE

As this article was going to press, the NLRB declined to assert
jurisdiction to determine the employment status of the Northwestern
University football players, effectively preventing the college athletes
from unionizing only at Northwestern University under the NLRA.292
The NLRB's decision did not hinge on the issue of whether or not the
college athletes are employees under the NLRA, but rather on its
determination that the Board would not promote stable industrial
relations under the NLRA even if it viewed the college athletes as
statutory employees.293
Even if the NLRB was reasonable in determining that collective
bargaining would not provide for stable industrial relations in college
football, such a determination could have been better reached by the
parties themselves, particularly the college athletes. According to the
Board, collective bargaining in college football would require leaguewide bargaining, including with those units with putative public sector
employees who are beyond the reach of the NLRB's jurisdiction-the
college athletes who play for state schools. 2 94

The arrangement of

college football proved too complex for the NLRA's model of collective
bargaining, according to the NLRB.295
The Board limited its decision to the facts of the case.296 However,
this decision could be used by those in management positions to justify
further instances of non-recognition of employees in other non-standard

291. Tomassetti, supra note 5, at 817.
292. See Nw. Univ. v. Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n (CAPA), 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 1 (Aug.
17, 2015).
293. See id. at 3.

294. See id. at 5.
295. See id. at 3.
296. Id. at 6.
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forms of employment.29 7 The response to such attempts of nonrecognition will thus necessarily remain the good old fashion one:
workers will have to fight for recognition despite the law, through their
collective efforts.

297. See id. at 6 n.28. ("The Board also has discretion pursuant to [Section] 14(c)(1) of the Act
to 'decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of
employees' where the Board concludes that 'the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not
sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction."'). Id. (quoting Council 19, Am.
Fed'n of State Emp. v. NLRB, 296 F. Supp. 1100, 1104 (N.D. Ill. 1968)).
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